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Abstract
In this article, I press a line of objection to Jonathan Quong’s moral status account 
of liability to defensive harm. The claim on which I rest my critique is captured by 
the article’s title: if one can’t lose such a right in these circumstances, one never had 
it in the first place.
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On what has come to be known as the ‘moral responsibility account’ of liability to 
defensive killing, it is one’s moral responsibility for being a threat, rather than cul-
pable behaviour, that renders one liable to defensive killing. Moreover, one’s lack of 
moral responsibility for being a threat grounds one’s nonliability to defensive kill-
ing. Among its many virtues, The Morality of Defensive Force offers a sustained and 
powerful critique of the moral responsibility account. Jonathan Quong also offers an 
alternative account of liability to defensive killing, which he calls the ‘moral status 
account’. I have defended the moral responsibility account and am one of the targets 
of Quong’s critique.1 In this article, I press a line of objection to his moral status 
account.
I presented an earlier version of this paper at a conference in 2018 at the University of Warwick on a 
draft of The Morality of Defensive Force. I thank Jonathan Quong and the other participants for their 
comments on that occasion. On pp. 164–166 of the published version of his book, Quong engages 
with the line of criticism I press here. See my quotations from p. 165 below and my response which 
follows.
 * Michael Otsuka 
 m.h.otsuka@lse.ac.uk
1 Department of Philosophy, London School of Economics, London, UK
1 I offer such a defence in ‘Killing the Innocent in Self-Defense’, Philosophy and Public Affairs 23 
(1994): 74–94, and ‘The Moral Responsibility Account of Liability to Defensive Killing’, Christian 
Coons and Michael Weber, eds., The Ethics of Self-Defense (Oxford University Press, 2016), pp. 51–68.
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I shall orient my discussion around two cases in which, on the moral responsibil-
ity account, it is deemed permissible to kill another in self-defence because she is 
morally responsible for her behaviour even though she is also blameless. As we shall 
see in a moment, Quong’s moral status account reaches a different verdict regarding 
permissibility across these two cases.
The first case involves someone who mistakenly but non-culpably tries to kill an 
innocent person in self-defence:
Mistaken Attacker: The identical twin brother of a notorious serial killer is 
driving during a stormy night in a remote area when his car breaks down. Una-
ware that his brother has recently escaped from prison and is known to be hid-
ing in this same area, he knocks on the door of the nearest house, seeking to 
phone for help. On opening the door, Resident justifiably believes the harmless 
twin is the killer. Resident has been warned by the authorities that the killer 
will certainly attack anyone he meets on sight, and so Resident lunges at him 
with a knife. (23–24)2
If mistaken Resident stabs the innocent twin, he would be doing something that 
appears to be objectively wrong: he would be killing a nonresponsible person who, 
it seems, is not in fact liable to be killed, and whose killing cannot be justified on 
any other objective grounds either. But such a killing would be subjectively mor-
ally justifiable, since mistaken Resident would be acting on the justified (but false) 
belief, grounded in a reasonable assessment of the evidence, that he is defending 
himself against an attack by a culpable serial killer.
Is mistaken Resident liable to be defensively killed, if this is the only way to 
save the life of the innocent stranded twin? Proponents of the moral responsibility 
account maintain that he is. They infer liability on grounds that, as I wrote in 1994, 
a morally ‘responsible agent takes a gamble by placing [his] moral immunity on 
the line when [he] engages in such avoidable risky activity’ as the lunging at some-
one with a knife.3 There I was drawing an implicit analogy between the bad moral 
luck of becoming morally liable to be killed and Ronald Dworkin’s notion, within 
the realm of distributive justice, of bad option luck. Someone voluntarily chooses to 
gamble with his moral worth, so to speak, by knowingly engaging in risky activity 
that might imperil the innocent. Mistaken Resident who tries to stab someone who 
turns out to be innocent is morally unlucky in much the same way as someone who 
gambles on the stock market and loses is financially unlucky. The upshots of such 
gambles are not unfair because they are a matter of bad option luck rather than bad 
brute luck.4
2 All such parenthetical references are to The Morality of Defensive Force.
3 ‘Killing the Innocent in Self-Defense’, p. 91.
4 Option luck, as Dworkin defined it, is ‘a matter of … whether someone gains or loses through accept-
ing an isolated risk he or she should have anticipated and might have declined’. Brute luck, by contrast, 
is ‘a matter of how risks fall out that are not in that sense … gambles’. See Dworkin, ‘What is Equality? 
Part II: Equality of Resources’, Philosophy and Public Affairs 10 (1981): 283–345 at p. 293.
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Now let us contrast the case of mistaken Resident with the following case, which 
involves someone who accidentally, and non-culpably, imperils the life of another:
Conscientious Driver: Driver, who always keeps [her] car well maintained and 
always drives carefully and alertly, decides to drive to the movies. On the way 
a freak accident occurs that causes [her] car to veer out of control in the direc-
tion of a pedestrian. The out-of-control car will now kill the pedestrian unless 
the pedestrian destroys the car with a grenade, thereby killing Driver. (26–27)5
Jeff McMahan, who is the originator of this case, offers the following commentary 
on it, with which I am in agreement:
Although her act is of a type that is generally objectively permissible, and 
although she has taken due care to avoid harming anyone, she has had bad 
luck: the risk she knew her act carried has now, improbably and through no 
fault of her own, been realized. Because she knew of the small risk to others 
that her driving would impose, and because she nonetheless voluntarily chose 
to drive when there was no moral reason for her to do so[,] … she is morally 
liable to defensive action to prevent her from killing an innocent bystander.6
Quong concurs with McMahan and me that mistaken Resident has, by lunging at an 
innocent with a knife, rendered himself liable to be defensively killed. Yet he rejects 
our claim that conscientious Driver has also rendered herself liable. He rejects our 
moral responsibility account of liability in favour of his moral status account, which 
is attentive to an interesting feature that is alleged to differentiate mistaken Resi-
dent from conscientious Driver. According to Quong, in lunging with a knife at the 
person whom he believes to be threatening his life, mistaken Resident acts as if the 
person whom he confronts lacks rights that he in fact possesses. Moreover, Quong 
maintains that to ‘treat others as if they lack moral rights against having harm 
imposed is a grave matter’ (39). He says that:
When you act in this way, you treat others as if they are not entitled to the 
equal concern and respect all persons are normally owed, and so it’s appropri-
ate that you bear special liability for your actions when the people you harm 
do in fact have rights against the harmful acts you perform. (8)
By contrast, conscientious Driver never acts on the assumption that anyone lacks 
rights that she in fact possesses. The justification of our traffic laws to which she 
conforms—which appeals to a calculation of the costs and benefits of driving, 
including the cost of accidental deaths—does not depend on any assumption that 
people lack rights not to be harmed that they in fact possess. Nor, of course, does 
5 Derived from McMahan, Killing in War, p. 165. Both Quong and McMahan also discuss a variant 
involving an ambulance driver. To differentiate the ambulance driver from the conscientious driver, we 
might appeal to the relevance of the roles they occupy. See my discussion of the relevance of roles in 
‘Moral Luck: Optional, not Brute’, Philosophical Perspectives 23 (2009): 373–88.
6 Killing in War, p. 166.
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she hurtle accidentally out of control towards a pedestrian on the assumption that 
this pedestrian lacks rights not to be harmed. Of such a case, Quong writes:
[U]nlike the moral responsibility view, the moral status account does not 
implausibly declare that [conscientious] Driver [is] liable to defensive harm. 
… [T]he evidence-relative permissibility of getting behind the wheel of a vehi-
cle and imposing a tiny risk of harm on others does not depend on treating 
those others as if they lack any rights against harm. (39)
Conscientious Driver is nonliable to defensive harm for the following reason:
[W]hen you do not treat others as if they lack rights against harm—when the 
justification for your act accords the appropriate weight to the moral claims 
each person has—then it would be unreasonable to hold you liable for the 
harms that result from your act. (20)
More generally, Quong writes:
[T]he moral status conception declares that what matters is whether a per-
son, judged from the evidence-relative standpoint, acts as if others lack rights 
against harm. When, and only when, our actions have this particular feature—
treating others with something less than the concern and respect they are 
due—we make ourselves liable to defensive harm. (41)
Quong has identified a deep and interesting moral difference between cases in which 
one treats others as if they lack rights that they in fact possess and cases in which 
one does not treat others in this way. Nevertheless, I shall argue that Quong’s appeal 
to this distinction ultimately fails to support his position that mistaken Resident 
is liable to defensive killing, whereas conscientious Driver is not. This is because 
the very considerations regarding the reasonableness of our demands that Quong 
advances in support of the nonliability of conscientious Driver will carry over to 
immunise mistaken Resident from such liability as well. These considerations will 
establish that we should never have posited that the twin had a right in the first place 
not to be subject to Resident’s defensive attack.
I should note that I am offering an internal critique of Quong’s position. I am, 
however, somewhat sceptical of Quong’s claim that one establishes what claim 
rights people have on the basis of the considerations he offers regarding the cor-
relative duties it is reasonable to demand of others. Moreover, such an approach to 
ascertaining what rights we have would, I believe, be difficult to square with the 
moral responsibility account that I have defended. In the remainder of this article, 
I shall mainly bracket these general doubts and assume, for the sake of argument, 
the perspective of someone who accepts Quong’s approach to establishing rights by 
means of a particular account of what it is reasonable to demand of others.
Without further ado, here is my critique.
In explaining why conscientious Driver is not liable to be killed, Quong writes:
[W]e only have moral rights that others refrain from performing harmful (or 
potential harmful) acts when we can reasonably demand that they refrain from 
performing the act. It’s not reasonable to demand that others refrain from care-
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ful and conscientious behaviour when the behaviour poses only an extremely 
low risk of harm …. (5)
My challenge to Quong is this: someone who believes this about conscientious 
Driver must, on pain of inconsistency, also maintain that it is unreasonable to 
demand that mistaken Resident refrain from engaging in defensive force when faced 
with his predicament.
According to Quong, mistaken ‘Resident acts on the basis of justified beliefs’, 
and therefore ‘his act of “self-defense” is permissible in the evidence-relative sense. 
He thus cannot be culpable—he has a full epistemic excuse’ (24). How, in the light 
of this, can it be reasonable to demand that mistaken Resident refrain from doing 
that which a reasonable assessment of the evidence implies to be necessary to save 
his own life from an attack by a culpable aggressor who has forfeited his immunity 
from defensive harm?
On behalf of his claim that mistaken Resident renders himself liable to be killed, 
Quong maintains that ‘Surely Resident lacks the standing to complain if the twin 
must break Resident’s arms to prevent himself from being killed’ (24). While this 
may be true, it does not serve to differentiate mistaken Resident from conscientious 
Driver. This is because conscientious Driver would also lack standing to complain if 
Pedestrian must break Driver’s arm to save his own life. In both cases, we would be 
able to appeal to a lesser evil justification for imposition of the lesser harm on one of 
two non-culpable parties.
In differentiating conscientious Driver from mistaken Resident, Quong appeals 
to a more general distinction, which is captured by the following pair of questions:
1. Under what conditions does a person have a claim not to be harmed by a particular 
type of act performed by another person?
2. Has some particular person, A, waived, transferred, or forfeited this claim not to 
be harmed by another person, B? (162)
Quong maintains that ‘The answer to the latter question depends on what A has actu-
ally done, and not on B’s evidence about what A has done’ (162). This is because 
‘there are powerful reasons why transfer, waiver, and forfeiture should depend on 
what the right-holder actually does rather than anyone’s evidence about what she’s 
done. Most importantly, this grants the right-holder a more effective degree of con-
trol over the right, something that is typically of central importance’ (165). Quong 
maintains, however, that:
the same argument doesn’t apply to the question of whether someone has a 
right in the first place. When we’re deciding whether persons in general have 
a right that others refrain from Φ-ing, it makes sense to focus on what we can 
reasonably demand of others. For example, can I reasonably demand that no 
one speak at a volume louder than a whisper on a busy city street? (165)
These remarks apply to mistaken Resident as follows: Having established that the 
twin who knocks on Resident’s door has a right not to be subject to lethal defen-
sive harm, it follows that the twin is not liable to suffer such harm unless he has 
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waived, transferred, or forfeited his claim not to be harmed. Moreover, he waives, 
transfers, or forfeits his right only by behaving in a particular fashion, which is a 
matter of the facts rather than the evidence available to Resident.
I would now like to press the following challenge to Quong’s attempt to dif-
ferentiate mistaken Resident from conscientious Driver. Recall that I pressed 
the point earlier that it would be unreasonable to expect Resident to refrain from 
defending himself in the predicament in which he finds himself. Now I can fully 
grant Quong’s claim that such unreasonableness does not bear on the question 
of whether the twin has waived, transferred, or forfeited any right he possesses 
not to be subject to lethal defensive harm. Such unreasonableness does, however, 
bear on the question of whether we should have posited that the twin ever had a 
right in the first place against being subject to lethal defensive harm in the cir-
cumstances in which he found himself. Nothing Quong has said blocks the fol-
lowing challenge: Given the unreasonable burden on people in the predicament of 
mistaken Resident that such a right would impose, we should never have posited 
a right in the first place against being subject to defensive harm in the circum-
stances in which the twin found himself. It would in fact be unreasonable to posit 
such a right in the first place precisely because, on Quong’s account, the rights-
bearer exercises extensive control over whether he loses his right. He cannot lose 
such a right simply by inadvertently and innocently manifesting overwhelming 
evidence to any reasonable observer that he is a dangerous serial killer who is 
about to attack.
Quong opens himself up to my challenge when he writes the following:
To establish a person’s liability to defensive force, we must ask whether that 
person threatens the moral rights of others by Φ-ing. And the answer to that 
question cannot be determined by asking whether it would be wrong for the 
person to Φ if she knew all the facts. Rather, it must be determined by asking, 
among other things, what it would be reasonable for others to demand of her 
given the importance of the affected activities, the costs involved, the options 
available, and the relative harms that others might suffer. (173, my emphasis)
It would, however, be unreasonable of others to demand that people such as Resi-
dent refrain from using lethal force to defend themselves against what any reason-
able person would be justified in believing on the evidence to be a culpable aggres-
sor who will murder them if they do not strike first. Given what Quong says in the 
passage I’ve just quoted, it follows from such unreasonableness that Resident does 
not threaten any moral right of the twin in lethally defending himself against him.
I now quote a passage from Quong’s book that offers further support of my claim 
that Resident contravenes no right of others because it would be unreasonable to 
demand that people in Resident’s predicament refrain from exercising defensive 
force. Quong writes that:
many everyday acts impose very small risks of harm on others, yet these risks 
are sufficiently low that others cannot reasonably demand that we refrain from 
performing them, and thus we contravene no person’s moral rights in perform-
ing these acts. (169)
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Note that innocent people run a very small ex ante risk of being harmed by someone 
who conscientiously exercises defensive force only in circumstances in which the 
evidence justifies such force. It would appear to follow from the passage I’ve just 
quoted that one cannot reasonably demand that people such as mistaken Resident 
refrain from performing such defensive acts. The quoted passage therefore appears 
to commit Quong to the conclusion that Resident does not contravene twin’s moral 
rights in attacking him.
A further problem with Quong’s account arises: Why, one might ask, can’t the 
behaviour that, as a matter of fact, results in twin’s losing his right not to be subject 
to defensive force be the behaviour of knocking on mistaken Resident’s door while 
looking just like a dangerous escaped serial killer who will attack unless attacked 
first? Presumably, Quong’s answer would be that, if one could lose one’s right in 
this manner, then one would not have an effective enough degree of control over 
the right. But we don’t ultimately care about the effective degree of control over the 
rights we have. Rather, we ultimately care about having an effective degree of con-
trol over our lives. Such control is reduced not merely by having less control over the 
rights we possess against being subject to defensive force. It is also reduced by hav-
ing fewer, rather than more, rights in the first place against being subject to defen-
sive force. For this reason, I do not think Quong can sustain his contrasting approach 
to answering his two general questions, the first of which is what rights do we have 
and the second of which is how can we lose those rights.
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